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ABSTRACT 
Identification of Network Externalities in Markets for Non-Durables 
by Michal Grajek1 
This paper introduces a structural econometric model of consumer demand for non-
durable goods, which exhibits network externalities. The structural model allows us to 
identify the parameters, which determine the strength of the externalities in the 
underlying economic model from the empirical estimation results. The estimates of 
these parameters can then be employed to test the economic significance of the 
externalities and the compatibility of networks. The identifying assumption that drives 
our results is that consumers care about the lagged instead of the current network size. 
We argue that it does not necessarily bound their rationality. To complete our structural 
model, we provide an example of functional specification that yields a simple linear 
stochastic model of demand. Using this functional specification, we identify all 
structural parameters of the model. In the end, the estimation and the stochastic 
structure of the resulting econometric model are discussed.  
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Identifikation der Netzwerkeffekten in den Märkten für nicht-dauerhafte Güter 
Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt ein strukturelles ökonometrisches Modell der 
Konsumnachfrage für nicht-dauerhafte Güter mit externen Netzwerkeffekten vor. Das 
strukturelle Modell lässt uns die Parameter von Netzwerkeffekten im zugrunde 
liegenden ökonomischen Modell empirisch zu identifizieren. Die Schätzer der 
Strukturparameter könnten für das Testen der Netzwerkkompatibilität  und der 
ökonomischen Signifikanz der Netzwerkeffekte verwendet werden. Für die 
Identifikation nehmen wir an, dass die Konsumenten die Netzwerksgröße verzögert 
wahrnehmen. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Annahme nicht notwendigerweise mit 
irrationalem Verhalten gleichzusetzen ist. Um das strukturelle Modell zu vollständigen, 
geben wir eine funktionale Spezifikation, aus der ein lineares stochastisches 
Nachfragemodell folgt. Unter Verwendung dieser Spezifikation sind alle 
Strukturparameter von dem Modell identifiziert. Zum Schluss diskutieren wir die 
Schätzung und die stochastische Struktur des sich ergebenden ökonometrischen 
Modells. 
 
iv 
  
                                                
1. Introduction 
 This paper introduces a structural econometric model of consumer demand for non-
durable goods or services exhibiting network externalities. Its main contribution is that it 
allows us to identify structural parameters that determine the extent of externalities in the 
underlying economic model from the empirical estimation results. The structural parameters’ 
estimates can be employed in turn to test the economic significance of the externalities and 
the compatibility of networks. The structure that we derive is mainly suited to deal with direct 
network externalities, e.g. as in telecommunication services. However, one could also think of 
it as of a reduced form arising from indirect network externalities. E.g. in the case of 
experience goods, the installed base of consumers could matter, if they transmit information 
about quality of the good. 
Generally, positive network externalities mean that utility, which users derive from 
consumption of a given good or service, increases with the number of other users.1 The 
modern economic literature usually distinguishes two major types: direct and indirect network 
externalities (see e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994; Economides and White 1994; 
Economides 1996). The first one is related to physical networks, e.g. supported by 
telecommunication technologies like telephone, telegraph, facsimile or e-mail. Clearly, the 
utility, which consumers derive from using any of these technologies, depends on the number 
of other users. The most obvious reason for a positive dependence is that a larger network 
allows consumers to satisfy more communication needs. The other reason might be the 
bandwagon effect, which arises because conspicuous consumption gives rise to a conformist 
behavior as argued by Leibenstein (1950). Blonski (2002) considers another explanation in 
the context of telecommunication market with competing networks. In his model, it is cheaper 
for consumers to call within their network, since network suppliers charge access fees for the 
calls from outside into their networks. As a consequence, consumers benefit from a larger 
network, because it implies a lower monthly bill, hence endogenous network externalities 
arise. A negative dependence between network size and utility, which consumers derive from 
network good, might be justified by congestion or by non-conformism of consumers. 
In turn, in a typical virtual network the externality is indirect and comes from the 
hardware/software paradigm (see Katz and Shapiro, 1985). It applies when a good consists of 
two complementary components: hardware, which is durable, and software, which exhibits 
 
1 Throughout the paper, the term network externalities is used interchangeably with the term network effects. 
The difference between the two is that in addition to network effects, network externalities imply also a market 
failure (see Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). In the context of our paper this might depend on interpretation of the 
economic model. 
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supply-side economies of scale. The number of users of a given hardware is relevant since it 
determines the size of the market for software and influences positively its variety and quality, 
hence enhancing the utility from using that hardware. This way of reasoning may be applied 
to computer operating systems, credit cards, video recorders, phonograph equipment etc. 
The main difficulty, which our structural econometric model has to overcome, is the 
multiplicity of equilibria, a common result in theoretical studies of markets featured by 
network externality. In a one-shot (or static) setting, multiple equilibria are due to 
coordination problems (see Farrell and Klemperer, 2001, pp. 47-50). The simplest example, 
with one pure network good may be found in Economides and Himmelberg (1995).2 They 
show that consumers’ expectations of no network good provision as well as positive levels of 
the network good sales at a given non-negative price may actually be self-fulfilling 
equilibrium outcomes.  
It is also a common wisdom that network externalities could give rise to some sort of 
S-shaped diffusion of network good’s sales over time. Multiple steady states in dynamic 
models of demand with network externalities are analogous to multiple static equilibria. 
Switching from the low steady state to the high one can be seen as network diffusion (see 
Cabral, 1990). Since there are infinitely many diffusion paths, which are supported by 
fulfilled consumers’ expectations, the question of interest is when and how fast the diffusion 
occurs. Cabral (1990) addresses this question in a perfectly competitive setting with one 
network good. As an equilibrium selection rule, he introduces lagged instead of expected 
network size into consumers’ willingness-to-pay function. By doing so, he obtains a unique 
network diffusion path. This even holds when the lag length is infinitely small, in which case, 
consumers are claimed to be rational. A drawback of the model is that the infinitely small lag 
causes at the same time a discontinuous jump in the equilibrium network diffusion path. In 
other words, the “rational” diffusion process is infinitely fast. Being aware of this 
counterfactual feature, Cabral (1990) argues that the discontinuous diffusion path in his model 
can be treated as an approximation to the empirically observed S-shaped diffusion. In fact, 
assuming small but non-zero perception lag yields such result. 
Economides and Himmelberg (1995) propose another solution in the context of 
perfectly competitive market. The unique network diffusion path in their model results from 
the assumption that supply of the network good is finitely elastic in the sense that the 
marginal cost function depends positively on the derivative of network size with respect to 
time. In other words, the change of network size is costly and these additional (over marginal) 
 
2 However, seminal works are Rohlfs (1974) and Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
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costs are passed through to consumers. In this model consumers form expectations and the 
expectations are fulfilled along the equilibrium network diffusion path. Moreover, the 
assumption about finitely elastic supply resolves the discontinuity problem discussed above. 
This is because by construction of the marginal cost function, a discontinuous diffusion would 
imply an infinitely high price. 
In this paper we take the former approach. Following Cabral (1990), we assume that 
consumers care about the lagged network size in their decision about buying the network 
good (joining the network). This approach is very appealing from an empirical perspective. 
First, as we will show, it allows us to identify the structural parameters from the estimation 
results. Economides and Himmelberg (1995) fail to prove that one can do this in their model. 
Second, the use of lagged dependent variable is common in econometric practice.  
The limitation of the approach we follow is that consumers are rational only when the 
lag length tends to zero, at least in our simple setup.3 If the lag becomes larger, as it is the case 
with empirical data time series, consumers do not consider that during the diffusion process 
the network grows in current period. Another implication of the model is that empirical 
magnitude of network effect depends to some extent on lag length, hence on data frequency. 
This is because the stronger network effects and more frequent updating of the network size 
both speed up the diffusion.  
The model, which we derive, is also closely related to the marketing literature on 
diffusion of innovations. In seminal work of Bass (1969), a structural econometric model of 
new product diffusion is developed, which is driven solely by the diffusion of awareness of 
this product. The striking feature of the original Bass’ (1969) model is that price does not 
influence the diffusion. The marketing scientist recognized that puzzle and developed many 
extended models with the price incorporated (e.g. Horsky, 1990; Jain and Rao, 1990; Bass, 
Krishnan and Jain ,1994). Our structural econometric model is not an extension of the seminal 
Bass’ (1969) model. We use the theory of network externalities instead of imperfect 
information in order to facilitate diffusion. However, the equation to estimate in our example 
coincides with the equation proposed in Bass (1969), except the additional price variable, 
which is in there in our model. 
So far, there is little empirical work that measures the consumption network 
externality. Some works follow the reduced form approach looking for an empirical evidence 
for network effects. Greenstein (1993) conducts the first research in that stream. He shows 
 
3 E.g. in the case of experience goods the lag might be justified, because the network externalities arise through 
information transmition, which takes time. Also in the case of direct network externalities, one might argue that 
the lag results from costly updating of information about the network size. 
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  that compatibility with the installed base matters in the choice of the mainframe computer 
system. Gandal (1994, 1995) estimates hedonic price equations for spreadsheets and data base 
management systems and finds that consumers are willing to pay significant premium for 
software supporting a common file compatibility standard. This result is in line with the 
hypothesis that the software markets exhibit network externalities. Similar findings report 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996). Additionally, they find that a product’s installed base 
increases the price of spreadsheets. Gandal, Greenstein and Salant (1999) show the two-way 
positive feedback between different components in competing microcomputer systems by 
means of vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. In this way, they prove empirically the 
indirect network externality hypothesis. Dranove and Gandal (2000) study the effect of DIVX 
preannouncement in the DVD market. They find that the preannouncement indeed slowed 
down the adoption of DVD technology as predicted by the theory of competition with 
network externalities.  
Economides and Himmelberg (1995) conduct the pioneering study that goes in the 
direction of structural econometric modeling. In the economic part of their paper they derive a 
dynamic model of a perfectly competitive market with consumption network externalities. 
The possible multiplicity of equilibrium network diffusion paths under fulfilled consumers’ 
expectations is solved by the assumption of finitely elastic supply, as described above. In the 
empirical part they estimate the demand for facsimiles in the U.S. over 1978-1991. The 
assumption that facilitates the estimation is that expected network size is a linear function of 
the past network size. Fulfilled expectations would then lead to a constant growth rate of the 
U.S. fax network, which is counterfactual and breaks the consistency of that structural model. 
Another structural econometric work concerning network externalities includes Gandal, 
Kende, and Rob (2000) for the CD industry and Rysmann (2002) for the Yellow Pages 
market. These authors concentrate however on the indirect network effect and estimate two 
interrelated demand equations, for software and hardware. In this way, they model the 
complementarities between software and hardware in full instead of putting the network size 
into the consumers’ utility function as in the direct network externality case.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic model, which 
yields the structure for the empirical investigation. Section 3 gives an example of the 
functional specification that leads to a simple stochastic model and discusses the identification 
and interpretation of the structural parameters. Section 4 concludes. 
  
4 
 
  2. The Economic Model 
2.1. Willingness-to-Pay Function 
 The demand model we use is a partial equilibrium, discrete choice, dynamic model. The 
good being considered is non-durable, ex ante homogenous4 and subject to network 
externalities. We refer to the good supplied by different firms as brands. A consumer’s 
willingness to pay for a given brand is influenced by her type and by the network size of that 
brand. We refer to the network as a set of subscribers and to the purchase of the non-durable 
network good as subscribing to the network.  
Denote by i (i = 1, 2, ..., I) the brand of the homogenous good and assume that there is 
a measure one of infinitely living consumers, each demanding at most one unit of the good. 
Consumer v’s preference for brand i at time t is represented by the instantaneous willingness-
to-pay function u(v,xi(t-δ)), where v is the individual preference parameter, xi(t-δ) is the 
lagged network size of brand i and the perception lag δ in an arbitrary number. Formally, we 
assume that the individual preference parameter v is distributed over the interval [0,1] 
according to the cumulative density function F(v), and that u(v,xi(t-δ)) is strictly increasing 
and continuous in v. By construction, the parameter v establishes a rank ordering of the 
consumers according to their willingness to pay. We assume that the ranking is invariant with 
respect to changes in xi(t-δ). As a matter of convention, the higher v is, the larger is the benefit 
of using each network. Network externalities are captured by the dependence of each 
consumer’s willingness to pay on the network size xi(t-δ). 
 Introduction of the lagged network size xi(t-δ) into the willingness-to-pay function is 
crucial to our model. As pointed out by Cabral (1990), it is an equilibrium selection device 
that gives us the unique diffusion path of each network i. However, there appears a natural 
concern about consumer’s rationality in this setting. Cabral (1990) argues that if the lag δ is 
infinitely small the consumers are rational. This is because their subscription decisions are 
identical to the ones done by forward-looking consumers. However, the construction of 
willingness-to-pay function does not allow them to coordinate in order to switch from the low 
steady state to the high one, when both are feasible. Section 2.5 explains these findings in 
detail. 
 From an empirical perspective, the lagged network size in the willingness-to-pay 
function corresponds to the lagged dependent variable in the estimated equation. Obviously, 
the lagged dependent variable is easier to work with than with some unobserved expectations 
of the consumers. The cost of this approach is that we have to give up the rationality of the 
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consumers with respect to the network size in most of the cases. This is because the 
minimum lag length is naturally defined by the frequency of the data and is usually large. 
Consequently the approximation of the rational consumers’ behavior is poor.  
 
2.2. Subscription Demand 
Each brand i has its network constituting of a set of subscribers. If the brands are 
incompatible, each makes up its own network so xi(t-δ) = yi(t-δ), where yi(t-δ) stands for the 
normalized sales of brand i (the number of subscribers to brand i). However, if the brands are 
perfectly compatible then the network is common, which is given by total sales of all brands 
. By homogeneity, brands with identical network size (in particular 
compatible brands) are perceived by consumers as perfect substitutes. 
∑
=
−=−
I
j
ji tytx
1
)()( δδ
In a more general setting, partial compatibility may prevail. In this case, the network 
size of a brand is a weighted sum of its own and all other subscribers. Under symmetry 
assumption, we could write it as , where  
measures the degree of compatibility. w = 1 and w = 0 correspond to the perfect compatibility 
and perfect incompatibility respectively and the interior values of w indicate a partial 
compatibility. 
∑
≠
−+−=−
ij
jii tywtytx )()()( δδδ [ ]1,0∈w
In each instance of time, consumer v decides to buy one of the brands or to stay out of 
the market in order to maximize her net utility 
(1) u(v,xi(t-δ)) – pi(t) 
If (1) is negative for all brands, than she will not join any of them. This “static” decision rule 
in our dynamic model is appropriate, as we focus on non-durable goods. In the context of 
telecommunication service this would mean that consumers could initiate or relinquish their 
subscription costlessly. 
 The consumer for whom (1) equals zero is indifferent between subscribing to and 
staying out of a given network. Denote vi,t* = v*(xi(t-δ),pi(t)) the type of the indifferent 
consumer with respect to brand i in time t. vi,t* can be obtained from 
(2) u(vi,t*,xi(t-δ)) = pi(t). 
 The brand i for which vi,t* is the lowest is the most attractive brand for all subscribers 
in time t. Define 
4 By ex ante homogeneity we mean that different brands of the good are perceived as intrinsically equal. 
However, the difference in their valuation is possible ex post, when they have different network sizes. 
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By construction, all consumers with higher preference parameter than vL,t* buy the good. If 
vi,t* is equal among some brands, then the subscribers choose among them with equal 
probability. Define 
(4) Hi(vt* ) ≡  

 =−
otherwise
vvif
I
vF
tLti
tL
tL
0
**
*)(1
,,
,
,
, 
where vt* = (v1,t*, v2,t*,..., vI,t*  ) is a vector of the indifferent types with respect to brand i in 
time t, IL,t is the number of brands for which vi,t* = vL,t* and F is the distribution function of v. 
Hi equals the number of the consumers willing to buy brand i in time t. Now, the state 
equations, which describe the evolution of each brand’s sales over time, are given by 
(5) yi(t) = Hi(vt*). 
In the steady-state (given that all prices stay constant) we expect that none of the consumers 
can increase her utility by changing the subscription decision, so each brand’s sales stay 
constant over time 
(6) yi(t) = yi(t-δ). 
 It is worth noting that the steady-state equilibrium demand of the above model 
coincides with the standard static model equilibrium with fulfilled consumers’ expectations 
(see Rohlfs, 1974 and Economides and Himmelberg, 1995). Moreover, the process of 
achieving equilibrium, which we have described formally, is in line with the logic presented 
by Rohlfs (1974). 
 
2.3. Switching Costs 
The above model of demand with network externalities is probably the most obvious 
extension of the Cabral (1990) single brand model. It possesses however some unnatural 
features. One of them is a particular symmetry. In each instance of time, every active firm has 
an equal number of subscribers yi(t), which stays in contrast to the observation that real firms’ 
market shares exhibit persistent differences. 
The other feature corresponds to the Bertrand’s paradox. If one firm undercuts the 
others just a little bit it wins immediately the whole market. This creates a strong incentive to 
undercut and results in fierce price competition. Moreover, with incompatibility, it is 
extremely difficult to recoup market shares once a firm lost its customers. This is because 
without installed base it needs to offer far more attractive price then the rival, which just won 
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  the whole market. In that case the Bertrand’s paradox is even stronger and the market 
outcome is extremely tippy.  
Switching costs offer a solution to the problems mentioned above and are particularly 
relevant to network markets. In fact, network externalities and switching costs are closely 
related to each other (see Farrell and Klemperer, 2001). 
Suppose, switching costs are high enough, such that having bought one brand, 
consumers will never find it optimal to switch to another one later on. The type of switching 
costs we have in mind can be observed in mobile telecommunication markets. That is, 
consumers have to pay a penalty for premature cancellation of a long-term contract. As a 
security option, they have however the right to relinquish the subscription without any penalty 
when the firm raises the price. In other words, once the price goes up the switching costs are 
gone. 
The introduction of switching costs of this kind changes the subscription demand 
described in the previous section to the extent that only the unattached consumers can feed the 
diffusion of the networks. So, we can rewrite (4) as 
(7) Hi’(vt*, vt-δ* ) ≡  

 =−−
otherwise
vvif
I
vFvF
tLti
tL
tLtL
0
**
*)(*)(
,,
,
,, δ
. 
Now, Hi’ equals the number of the new consumers willing to buy the brand i in time t. 
Accordingly, the state equations are given by 
(8) yi(t) = Hi’(vt*, vt-δ*) + yi(t-δ). 
This demand specification allows for persisting differences in market shares of 
different brands. In particular, the incumbent’s installed base of consumers constitutes a 
persisting competitive advantage over the entrant. 
Together with switching costs we introduce new issues concerning the pricing by the 
firms. First of all, remember that the specification in (7) remains valid until the prices go up. 
Otherwise, we are back to the set-up without switching costs as in (4). The switching costs 
will change also the price setting itself. We discuss that to some extent in the next section. 
 
2.4. Supply of the Network Good 
 To complete the economic model of the market we would need to model how the 
prices are determined. Since the paper focuses on the demand side of the market and, in 
particular, on identification of the network effects, we do not introduce a structure for the 
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supply side. Instead, we discuss some possibilities of extending the economic model to 
contain the explicit pricing relation as well. 
 In the simplest case without switching costs, we could plausibly assume that fierce 
price competition drives prices down to marginal costs. If firms are symmetric regarding their 
production technology, prices of all brands will be equal and their changes over time will 
reflect some technological progress and/or economies of scale. As a consequence, market 
outcomes will be completely symmetric. If the firms start their activity simultaneously with 
zero network size their brands will remain equally attractive for the consumers. In other 
words, expression (1) will be equal for all i. No firm will drop out of the market (IL,t = I) and 
their networks will grow (or decline) equally fast. This set of assumptions facilitates static, 
marginal-costs pricing relation, which is well established in the empirical Industrial 
Organization literature (see Bresnahan, 1989). 
Once we introduce switching costs, a space for strategic pricing emerges. Indeed, 
switching costs in our set up tend to reduce competition and give firms the opportunity to earn 
some mark-ups.5 In that case, firms face a trade-off. On the one hand, they want to keep prices 
high in order to exploit the installed base of consumers. On the other hand, they want to lower 
prices to attract new subscribers, i.e. to enhance the installed base in the future. Static, 
marginal-costs pricing is no longer appropriate for modeling this kind of pricing behavior, as 
it does not take account of this trade-off. Instead, state-space games, in which actions taken in 
one period shift payoffs in subsequent periods, could be utilized with installed bases of firms 
as natural state variables (see Basar and Olsder, 1999). Examples of empirical dynamic 
pricing models within this framework have been developed in the learning-by-doing literature 
(e.g. Jarmin, 1994). In these models, cumulative past sales benefit firms in that they lower 
production costs, what gives rise to a similar trade-off as with network externalities and 
switching costs. 
 From an econometric perspective, we do not necessarily need structure for supply 
relation to be able to correctly estimate the network externalities parameters. Endogeneity 
problems regarding the price variable can be resolved by instrumental variable technique. 
 
2.5. Dynamics of the Network Good Adoption 
To get the intuition of dynamics of the network good adoption, a graphical analysis is 
useful. For simplicity of the presentation we abstract from switching costs and assume the 
price to be equal across brands, as with perfect competition, and constant over time. We 
 
5 See Klemperer (1995) for an overview of switching costs impact on competition and prices. 
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  present the common (compatible) network dynamics, so the subscripts i are omitted 
throughout this section. In other words, there is one network and one competitive price in this 
exercise. Because of the symmetry on the supply side, the evolution of the subscriber sets of 
particular brands is proportional to the common network evolution. To further simplify 
matters we assume also that the cumulative density function F(v) and the willingness-to-pay 
function u(v, x(t-δ)) are continuously differentiable in all arguments.   
Detailed mathematical treatment of the equilibrium network size path in such model can 
be found in Cabral (1990). The author proves there that if networks externalities are strong 
and the lag length δ tends to zero the equilibrium adoption path is unique and discontinuous.  
The equilibrium adoption path is described by equation (5). It says, that the function H 
maps the network size from time t-δ to t. Given the assumptions of this section, (5) simplifies 
to 
(9) x(t) = H(vt*) ≡ 1 - F(vt*) 
To gain intuition on how network externalities and price affect diffusion we calculate the 
derivatives of H with respect to the lagged network size x(t-δ) and price p in the appendix. 
Since H maps the network size from time t-δ to t, it is convenient to think of it as of a function 
of the lagged network size x(t-δ). Examination of (A.11) in the appendix leads to the 
following lemma  
 
Lemma 1: Whenever the solution to equation (2) exists, i.e. vt* is defined, and the 
density f(vt*) is strictly positive, the extent of network externalities measured by 
)(
))(*,(
δ
δ
−∂
−∂
tx
txvu t  determine the slope of the function H in the x(t-δ) domain, such that 
(i) H is non-decreasing if and only if network externalities are non-negative,  
(ii) the slope of H equals zero if there are no network externalities, and  
(iii) the slope of H is larger if network externalities are stronger, other things being 
equal. 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates dynamics of the network good adoption. In its upper part we draw H 
as the function of the lagged network size x(t-δ). Lemma 1 formalizes the link between the 
extent of network externalities and the slope of H, which in turn determines the dynamics of 
diffusion. The lower part of figure 1 shows the steady-state equilibria of the network size for 
each price p, denoted D(p). As it has been already mentioned, it coincides with the analogous 
static model equilibria with fulfilled consumers’ expectations. Dynamic model allows, 
10 
 
  however, to discriminate among multiple steady-state equilibria. Suppose for the moment 
that the market price is p* such as in the figure 1. Then according to the state equation (9) the 
network size will evolve in the way the upper part of the figure 1 indicates. If it starts at some 
size smaller than x1 it will eventually reach x0, if the starting network size is bigger than x1 it 
will end up in x2. If the network size for some reason equals exactly x1, it will stay there, but 
any arbitrarily small shock will lead to equilibrium at x0 or x2. Therefore we can conclude that 
x0 and x2 are stable steady states, while x1 is unstable. To apply this way of reasoning to any 
price p consider the following lemma  
 
Lemma 2: Whenever the solution to equation (2) exists, i.e. vt* is defined, and the 
density f(vt*) is strictly positive, changes in price p determine the shifts of the function 
H in the x(t-δ) domain, such that H(v*(x(t-δ),p1)>H(v*(x(t-δ),p2) for every x(t-δ) if 
p1<p2. 
 
Lemma 2 follows directly from examination of (A.7) in the appendix. It says that lowering the 
price shifts the function H up, although it does not need to be a parallel shift. Drawing steady 
states for each price yields the steady-state demand D(p). We can conclude that 
 
Theorem 1: downward-sloping parts of the steady-state demand D(p) consist of stable 
equilibria, while the upward-sloping parts are unstable, i.e. consist of critical-mass 
points. 
 
 Now, consider a case when price changes over time instead of being a constant. To see 
how the common network evolves let the price p(t) be a continuous and decreasing function 
of time and let p(0)>ph (as in figure 1) and x(p(0)) be the unique steady-state network size 
given p(0). As time passes and the price falls, the network size follows the lower steady-state 
size. Eventually the price reaches pl and just after that the network size jumps discontinuously 
to the higher steady-state and grows further on along it. Formally, this diffusion pattern has 
been shown to be correct for infinitely small lag δ in Cabral (1990).  
 If the perception lag is strictly positive, the consumers are myopic with respect to the 
network size. They do not recognize that the network is going to grow in the current period. 
As a consequence, the equilibrium network size does not follow exactly but rather tends to the 
steady-state size. There is no discontinuous jump in the network diffusion either. Instead, the 
diffusion pattern takes an S-shape.  
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   The dynamic perspective helps to understand the equilibrium selection rule assumed 
implicitly in our model by the lag structure. It does not allow for coordination among the 
consumers. Note, that it would be Pareto optimal to jump to the larger steady-state network 
size before price falls under pl. However, this would require the coordination of the 
consumers’ subscription decision in order to reach at least the critical mass.   
Another insight drawn from the analysis is a sort of substitutability between the extent 
of network externalities and the lag length, which is described by the following theorem 
 
Theorem 2: Network externalities, which  extent is measured by 
)(
))(*,(
δ
δ
−∂
−∂
tx
txvu t  and 
the perception lag of length δ are substitutes in the sense that both strenghtening of 
network externalities and shortening of the lag length speed up adoption of the 
network good. 
 
 The arrows in the upper part of the figure 1 indicate the change of the network size 
from time t-δ to time t. The length of these arrows reflects the speed of the network size 
growth (or decline). Now, strengthening the network effects, which implies according to 
lemma 1 a larger slope of the function H, and lowering the lag length (say to δ/2, so between 
time t-δ and t there are two “updates” of the network size) one can achieve the same network 
size growth. In other words, a large extent of network externalities together with a large 
perception lag may result in the same network diffusion speed as a small extent of 
externalities and a small lag. One should keep in mind this substitutability when interpreting 
empirical results. On the other hand, however, manipulating the lag does not influence the 
steady-state equilibria (the fixed points of the function H), while strengthening of network 
externalities does. This observation will to be important for the empirical identification of the 
network effects’ strength. 
 
3. The Stochastic Model 
3.1. Functional Specification 
 The next step towards the structural econometric model is to specify the functional 
forms in the underlying economic model. This section proposes an example of such 
specification. It has been chosen because of two reasons. First, the specification yields the 
demand relation as a simple linear equation (in parameters), which is convenient to work with 
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  empirically. Second, the demand relation nests the well-established Bass’ (1969) diffusion 
model.  
 Assume the consumers’ willingness-to-pay function to be 
(10) u(v, xi(t-δ)) = av + bxi(t-δ) + cxi2(t-δ), 
where a, b and c are parameters. As before, xi(.) denotes the network size and v the consumer 
type. This specification implies that a network of size zero has no other than intrinsic value, 
which is proportional to the consumer preference parameter v. Network size enters additively 
into the utility function, which means that consumers are homogenous in their valuation of the 
network. The square function of the network size catches its non-linear influence on the 
willingness to pay, e.g. diminishing positive marginal network effect, which is usually 
assumed in the literature. 
 The distribution of the individual preference parameters (consumers’ types) v is 
assumed to be uniform on the support [0,1], hence F(v) = v on that support. This 
distributional assumption corresponds to the linear demand function when the network size is 
fixed. As pointed out by Economides and Himmelberg (1995), the distribution of types is an a 
priori assumption, on which the identification of network effects in data critically depends. In 
that sense the uniform distribution of types is not very fortunate, because it attaches 
significant proportion of the diffusion S-shape to the network effect arbitrarily. However, we 
can modify the interpretation of the network externalities parameters slightly in order to 
incorporate some of the distributional effects. The section 3.4 discusses that issue in more 
details. 
 Given all the functional assumptions, we can calculate the index of the indifferent 
consumer with respect to each brand i from the equation (2) 
(11) )()()(1))(),((* 2 δδδ −−−−=− tx
a
ctx
a
btp
a
tptxv iiiii . 
The subscription demand of each brand at time t (the state equations) can be obtained from 
the equations (3)-(5) 
(12) 

 −+−+−= )()()(111)( 2
,
δδ tx
a
ctx
a
btp
aI
ty iii
tL
i . 
To get single demand equation (12) instead of a switching regime, we assume, that without 
switching costs the competitive pressure drives the prices down to the marginal costs, so the 
firms that survive in the market are endowed with the same production technology and set 
equal prices. This demand relation might be also relevant for the single brand market 
(IL,t = 1). The price then would be of course different from marginal cost. 
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   In the economic model we assumed that there is a measure one of consumers in the 
market. To be consistent with data we enhance the market to m consumers and call it the 
market potential6. To get actual network size values instead of normalized ones multiply both 
sides of (12) by m  
(13) 

 −+−+−= )()()(1)( 2
,
δδ tX
am
ctX
a
btp
a
mm
I
tY iii
tL
i , 
where Yi(t) = myi(t) and Xi(t-δ) = mxi(t-δ).  
 When the switching costs are consider we can still use the indifferent consumer indexes 
(11), but the subscription demand (actual, not normalized) obtained now from (3), (7) and (8) 
becomes 
(14) 

 −∆+−∆+∆−=∆ )()()(1)( 2
,
δδ tX
am
ctX
a
btp
a
m
I
tY iii
tL
i , 
where ∆Yi(t) = Yi(t) - Yi(t-δ), ∆Xi(t-δ) = Xi(t-δ) - Xi(t-2δ) and ∆Xi2(t-δ) = Xi2(t-δ) - Xi2(t-2δ). 
Again, to simplify matters we assume that the firms keep equal hedonic (i.e. adjusted for the 
network size) prices all the time. In other words, they compete for the new subscribers 
continuously. In principle, it would be also possible that they price low and high 
interchangeably. So that there would be periods over which one firm attracts the new 
subscribers and the other extracts a rent from the installed base and periods over which the 
roles are reversed. Actually, such consecutive pricing pattern is found in Farrell and Shapiro 
(1988), but it hinges rather on particular assumptions of their model7. 
 
3.2. Identification 
 Since data is in discrete time, we need the analogues of (13) and (14) for estimation 
purposes. Additionally, we let some stochastic noise enter the equations.  This yields 
(15) ( ) titititi
tL
ti XXpI
Y ,
2
1,21,1,
,
,
1 ξγγβα ++++= −−  and 
(16) ( ) titititi
tL
ti XXpI
Y ,
2
1,21,1,
,
,
1 ζγγβ +∆+∆+∆=∆ −−  
respectively, where Yi,t is the discrete analogue of Yi(t) = myi(t), which is the number of brand 
i’s customers in time t and Xi,t-1 is the analogue of Xi(t-δ), the lagged network size of brand i. 
ξi,t and ζi,t stand for the error terms and reflect the stochastic noise in the data. Because of the 
                                                 
6 The market potential differs in our formulation from the market potential in Bass (1969) in that it does not 
depend on price. 
7 See the discussion in Klemperer (1995). 
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  lagged dependent variables the stochastic structure of these equations might be quite 
complex. We introduce it in more details in the section 3.3. 
 All four structural parameters a, b, c, and m in (13) (IL,t is observable from the market 
structure) are uniquely identified from the estimates of (15). Simple algebra yields the scaling 
parameter a = - α/β, the network externalities parameters b = - αγ1/β and c = - α2γ2/β, as well 
as the market potential m = α.  
 In the case with switching costs we need some more manipulations. One cannot recover 
all the structural parameters from the estimates of (16) directly. This is because in contrast to 
(15), the equation (16) is expressed in terms of differences. By differentiating we loose the 
constant term, so there are only three parameter estimates with four structural parameters to 
identify. To solve this problem we need to write the sales equation in terms of levels, which 
yields 
(17) ( ) titititi
tL
titi XXpI
EY ,
2
1,21,1,
,
,
1 ψγγβαα +++++= −−  
where αi is a firm specific constant.  Et is a dummy variable indicating new entry, which is 
equal to zero in the periods prior to entry and one otherwise. This result is formally derived in 
the appendix for a general case, i.e. without any functional assumptions.  The intuition for this 
is as follows. Remember, that we have assumed equal hedonic prices among firms each 
period. Given this assumption, it follows from our economic structure that all active firms 
attract equal number of new subscribers each period. The only possible source of sustaining 
differences in total sales is a new entry. Because of the switching costs, the installed base of 
the incumbent constitutes the competitive advantage over the entrants. This advantage (or 
disadvantage in case of the entrants) is summarized by the firm specific constants αi. The 
formulation in (17) indicates that the entry happened only once. It is straightforward to extend 
it to multiple entries.  
 Now, we are able to identify all four structural parameters under switching costs as well. 
The same formulas as before (without switching costs) applied to the estimates of (17) yield 
the desired results. Note, that the interpretation of the parameters in (17) is the same as in 
(15). Indeed, as it is shown in the appendix, the sum of firm-specific constants equals zero. 
Switching costs do not influence the market potential or the network effects in our model. 
They simply allow for persisting asymmetries among firms expressed by nonzero firm 
specific constants αi.   
 Equation (17) is convenient also because it nests the two regimes, with and without 
switching costs. In particular, when the firm specific constants αi are zero, the sales of the 
15 
 
  firms are equal, and the equation (17) boils down to (15), which describes the evolution of 
sales under no switching costs. However, to get the simple sales equation under switching 
costs we assumed previously that the prices did not rise. Since we do not need that additional 
assumption under no switching costs, the validity of the equation (15) is slightly less 
restrained. That is why we decided to keep the two cases separately. 
 Now, let us turn to the question of compatibility of the brands. Our structure allows us to 
investigate the compatibility, that is to check to what extent the network externality operates 
at the industry level. To test the hypothesis of compatibility empirically, we let  
(18) Xi,t-1 = Yi,t-1 + wYj,t-1, 
whereY is the sum of all other brands’ customers in time t-1 and  
measures the degree of compatibility, as described in the section 2.2. Then (17) becomes 
∑
≠
−− =
ik
tktj Y 1,1, [ ]1,0∈w
(19) ( ) titjtjtititjtiti
tL
titi YYYYYYpI
EY ,
2
1,221,1,21
2
1,21,111,1,
,
,
1 ψγγγγγβαα ++++++++= −−−−−− . 
The identification of the structural parameters a, b, c, and m remains unchanged, since the 
estimates of α, β, γ1, and γ2 are still available there in (19). The new structural parameter w is 
however overidentified, because there are three new parameters γ11, γ21 and γ22 in the equation 
(19). It can be recovered from w = γ11/γ1, from w = γ21/2γ2, and from w2 = γ22/γ2. It follows 
that when the externality operates at the firm level only (incompatible networks, w = 0) we 
expect the estimates of γ11, γ21 and γ22 to be zero. In the polar case, when the externality 
operates at the industry level (fully compatible networks, w = 1), we expect γ11 = γ1, γ22 = γ2 
and γ21 = 2γ2. All the intermediate cases with partial compatibility can be easily obtained from 
the three equalities as well. 
 The overidentification of the structural compatibility parameter w gives a scope for a 
specification test. All three equalities identifying w must hold, otherwise there is something 
wrong with our model. Either the estimates are not correct, or data reject the structure.  
 On the other hand, we could use the overidentification to introduce parameter 
restrictions and to save on degrees of freedom. For example, recover w from w = γ11/γ1 and 
impose γ21 = 2γ11γ2/γ1 and γ22 = (γ11/γ1)2γ2. So we could estimate five instead of seven 
parameters in (19). 
 Last, as mentioned at the beginning of this section our structure corresponds to the 
information diffusion models widely studied in the marketing science. In particular, equation 
(19) nests the original diffusion equation proposed by Bass (1969) for the single product case. 
When we consider single brand diffusion, (19) simplifies to the original Bass model if β = 0 
(i.e. price does not matter for the network diffusion).  
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3.3. Stochastic Structure 
 The final step in the structural econometric model is to introduce the stochastic 
structure. So far, we have not imposed any assumptions on the error terms in (15), (16), (17), 
and (19). We have not proposed any estimation technique either. This is because it may be far 
less trivial than the simple, linear in parameters functional form of these equations suggests. 
 To illustrate the potential econometric pitfalls let us consider the market with network 
externalities operating at the industry level (fully compatible networks) and two competing 
brands. The equation (19) becomes then 
(20) ( ) ( )( ) titjtitjtititi YYYYpY ,21,1,21,1,1,, 21 ψγγβα ++++++= −−−− . 
 The most obvious way the stochastic noise can enter the empirical relation is a 
measurement error in the dependent variable. This makes sense in our model, since the price 
is usually easily observable by an econometrician, while the network size might be not. 
Suppose, that we observe the brand sales with some noise Yi,t + εi,t, where εi,t is some i.i.d. 
measurement error. In the estimation we put the observation with noise into our equation (20) 
creating the error term of the form 
(21) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,1,1,1,221,1,21,1,1,, 22 −−−−−−−− +++++++−= tjtitjtitjtitjtititi YY εεγεεγεεγεψ , 
which is clearly not an i.i.d. error. The error structure (21) received some attention in the time 
series econometrics8. The second and third term on the RHS of (21) indicate a multivariate 
nonlinear moving average. The fourth term points to a multivariate bilinear process. To 
correctly estimate the structural parameters of this model one needs to take care for the error 
generating process that is consistent with the assumed structure. A good news is that our 
economic model gives rise not only to the equations, but to a particular error structure in the 
econometric model as well. As a consequence, we do not need to rely solely on the statistical 
procedures to choose the appropriate error structure. 
 
3.4. Interpretation of the Identified Structural Parameters 
 Interpretation of the identified structural network externalities parameters b and c 
directly is difficult because of two reasons. First, as indicated already in the section 3.1, the 
empirical identification of the network effects relies heavily on the functional assumptions. In 
particular, the distribution of types plays a key role. Another assumption that influences the 
                                                 
8 See Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) for a nice overview of the nonlinear time series analysis. 
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  estimates of the network effects is the consumer perception lag δ that we impose by choosing 
data frequency. Second, even if we have statistically significant and correct estimates of b and 
c we still miss some threshold, which tells us which values of the parameters correspond to 
the economically significant network effects. 
 Going back to the first problem, our empirical estimates of the network effects can be 
biased because of the functional assumptions. In particular the uniform distribution of types is 
likely to bias the network estimates upward, i.e. to attach significant proportion of the 
diffusion S-shape to the network effect arbitrarily. The natural assumption is that the 
distribution of types mimics the distribution of consumer income, which is usually log-
normal9. The section 2.5 on the dynamics of network growth helps to understand how any bell 
shaped distribution of types contributes to the S-shape of the diffusion curve.  
 In the case of the perception lag the direction of bias is less clear. In general, we can 
expect that imposing larger (smaller) lag than the actual one creates an upward (downward) 
bias. But, the question, how large the actual lag is, remains open. The common sense just tells 
us that using monthly data (hence the one month perception lag) is more appropriate than 
using yearly data. In the section 2.5 we formalized the intuitive relationship between the lag 
length and the strength of network effects. We noted also that the steady-state equilibria are 
not affected by the lag manipulations. 
 Being aware of the possible bias in our estimates, how can we infer the economic 
significance of the identified network effects parameters? We propose to calculate the steady-
state inverse demand functions from (19) replacing all the parameters with their empirical 
estimates and imposing the steady-state conditions (6). All the important economic 
phenomena driven by the network effects, like multiple equilibria and critical mass of 
adopters, apply to the case with upward sloping demand. Therefore, the existence of the 
upward sloping part in the empirical steady-state demand function indicates strong network 
externalities.  
 The empirical steady-state demand function seems also more robust to the improper 
functional assumptions than the identified structural parameters themselves. First, the steady-
state equilibria are not affected by the lag manipulations. And second, the intuition suggests 
that attaching some distribution-of-types effects to the network effects should not change 
dramatically the shape of the steady-state demand function. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
we obtain an upward sloping part of the demand function in the estimation, while in fact it is 
all along downward sloping in the given market.  
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 Some additional information about the source of the network effect in the market under 
consideration can be obtained from the estimate of the compatibility parameter w. For 
example, the ability to satisfy more communication needs with the bigger consumers’ pool 
may give rise to direct network externalities, which operate at the industry level (compatible 
networks) in telecommunication markets. Whereas endogenous externalities as in Blonski 
(2002), which are created by firms charging an access fee for the calls from outside into their 
networks, operate at the firm level (incompatible brands).  
 Last, the estimate of the market potential parameter m may serve as another 
specification test. Usually, we have a rough guess of the total number of consumers, which 
could potentially subscribe to a network. Outstanding values of m signal problems with the 
estimates. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 This paper introduces a structural econometric model of consumer demand for non-
durable goods exhibiting network externalities. Its main contribution is that it allows us to 
recover the structural parameters responsible for the externalities. The structural parameters’ 
estimates can be employed in turn to test the economic significance of the externalities and 
the compatibility of networks.  
 The identifying assumption that drives our results is that the consumers care about the 
lagged instead of the current network size in their subscription decision. As Cabral (1990) we 
argue that when the lag is infinitely small this behavior is rational. It does not allow only for 
coordination among the consumers. 
  However, an empirical implementation of the model leads naturally (because of the 
data frequency) to a bigger than infinitely small lag. Then, if we interpret the economic 
models in terms of direct network externality, consumers are myopic with respect to the 
network size. In other words, they do not recognize that during the diffusion process the 
network grows in current period. Instead, they use the previous period network size in their 
purchase (subscription) decision. The “myopic” diffusion is slower and smoother (does not 
exhibit discontinuous jump) than “rational” diffusion. 
 On the other hand, the installed base of users could matter for the reasons other than the 
direct network externalities. For example, in the experience good case the installed base could 
transmit the information about the quality of the good enhancing the willingness to pay for it. 
In this case the lag in the network size has a natural explanation, since the transmission of 
9 Economides and Himmelberg (1995) study the distribution of consumer income in depth to obtain more 
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information takes time. This reinterpretation of the network effect preserves the rationality of 
consumers. 
  Our structure gives also important insights for interpretation of the empirical results. 
First, as mentioned already in Economides and Himmelberg (1995) the distribution of types is 
an important a priori assumption that the identification of network effects in data relies on. 
Second, the lag induced naturally by data frequency influences the empirically identified 
network effects too. The strength of the network effects and the lag length are in a sense 
substitutes in generating the diffusion S-shape. 
 We provide an example of functional specification that yields a simple linear stochastic 
model of demand. This demand model nests the original Bass’ (1969) model of innovation 
diffusion. Using the economic structure and the functional specification we are able to 
identify all structural parameters of the model. Interpreting the parameters correctly, we can 
still investigate the economic significance of the identified network effects. 
 Last, but not least, we brought stochastic structure into the model. Introducing a 
measurement error, as the most obvious source of stochastic noise in data, results in a non-
trivial error structure in our econometric model. To correctly estimate the structural 
parameters of the model one needs to take care for the error structure. 
reliable estimates of network effects. 
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  Appendix 
A.1. Derivatives of the function H with respect to x(t-δ) and p 
First, note that vt* is an implicit function of x(t-δ) and p, what under simplifying 
assumptions in the section 2.5 is described by 
(A.1) u(vt*, x(t- δ)) = p. 
 To calculate the derivative of H with respect to the lagged network size x(t-δ) we first apply 
the chain rule to the definition of H given in (9). We obtain 
(A.2) 
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The first term on the RHS of (A.2) is just the density of v at vt*. To calculate the second term 
note that the total derivative of u(vt*, x(t- δ)) with respect to x(t- δ) must stay constant in order 
to satisfy equation (A.1). This holds for 
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Solving (A.3) for 
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vt  and substituting that into (A.2) yields the desired result 
 (A.4) 
)(
))(*,(
*
)(*,(
*)(*)(
)(
1
δ
δδ
δ −∂
−∂⋅



∂
−∂⋅=−∂
∂ −
tx
txvu
v
txvuvfvH
tx
t
t
t
tt , 
where f is a density function of v. 
Analogously, to calculate the derivative of H with respect to the price p we first apply 
the chain rule to obtain 
(A.5) 
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Then we note that 
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and substitute to get 
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A.2. State equations with Firm-Specific Constants 
 To see how we can nest the two regimes (with and without switching costs) in a single 
set of the state equations rewrite (8) using the definitions (4) and (7) to 
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(A.8)  yi(t) = Hi(vt*) + yi(t-δ) – Hi(vt-δ*)
tL
tL
I
I
,
, δ− . 
Remember that we assume equal hedonic prices among firms. You can think of (A.8) as of a 
decomposition of the total sales of bran i in time t under switching costs. The first term on the 
RHS of (A.8) gives the total sales of brand i (number of subscribers) if there were no 
switching costs. The second and the third term adds and subtracts the installed base of brand i 
respectively in a way that is sensitive to the number of active firms in the market. To see how 
this can lead to persistent asymmetries among firms expand the recursive equation (A.8) to 
(A.9)  yi(T) = Hi(vT*) + Hi(vT-δ*) – Hi(vT-δ*)
TL
TL
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I
,
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L
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, 
where t = 0 indicates the time when the market starts up so there are no sales at that time and 
T > 0. 
 Suppose, there is constant number of firms active in the market such that IL,t = IL for 
. Then the last two terms on the RHS of (A.9) equal zero, because every firm is 
active from the very beginning of the market, and all the middle terms cancel out. In this case 
(A.9) simplifies to (5), i.e. the state equations with and without switching costs are the same. 
),0( Tt∈
 Now suppose, there was an entry into the market in t = E, and 0 < E < T. This means 
that IL,t rises discontinuously in t = E and stays at the higher level afterwards. The sales 
equations of the incumbents do not simplify to (5) any longer. They become instead  
(A.10) yiinc(T) = Hi(vT*) + [H∫+δ
E
E
i(vt-δ*) – Hi(vt-δ*)
tL
tL
I
I
,
, δ− ]dt, 
for T ≥ E+δ. The integral in (A.10) is positive. It is also invariant with respect to any events in 
T > E+δ and can be trated therefor as a firm-specific constant in the post-entry period. 
In contrast, the expansion of the recursive equation (A.8) does not go back to t = 0 for 
the entrants. Their history starts at t = E and the sales can be described by 
(A.11) yient(T) = Hi(vT*) + [ – H∫+δE
E
i(vt-δ*)
tL
tL
I
I
,
, δ− ]dt, 
for T ≥ E+δ. To see this result, refer to (A.8) and note that yient(t-δ) = 0 for . The 
integral in (A.11) plays analogous role for the entrants as the integral in (A.10) for 
incumbents, but it is negative. Therefore, we can conclude that  the incumbents have a 
constant (in terms of the difference in the total sales) competitive advantage over the entrants. 
),( δ+∈ EEt
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   Moreover one can show that the the fixed effects caused by entry sum up to zero. To 
see that the number of  incumbents as A and the number of entrants as B. The sum of the 
effects is then 
 A [H∫
+δE
E
i(vt-δ*) – Hi(vt-δ*)
tL
tL
I
I
,
, δ− ]dt + B [ – H∫
+δE
E
i(vt-δ*)
tL
tL
I
I
,
, δ− ]dt = 
(A.12) = A [H∫
+δE
E
i(vt-δ*) – Hi(vt-δ*) BA
A
+ ]dt + B [ – H∫
+δE
E
i(vt-δ*) BA
A
+ ]dt = 
= 



+−+− BA
AB
BA
AA
2
  H∫
+δE
E
i(vt-δ*) dt = 0. 
 One could also investigate the effects of exit in the analogous manner. Since in our 
economic structure there is no reason for a firm to leave the market we skip this discussion. 
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  Figure 1. Stable vs. unstable equilibria. 
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